Any theoretical construction presented in
assertoric discourse, besides information, contains a claim for the truth in the correspondence sense, i.e., for adequate description of the objective state of affairs.
To fit with its knowledge principles, data and conclusions can only produce
assertoric claims: It can be a better claim than previous ones, but it cannot be assumed as absolute or definitive (Polkinghorne, 1983).
I'll then show that this version of the objection, though attractive, involves a conflation between epistemic and
assertoric norms.
Hence, it is not susceptible to the kind of radical ambiguity that would undermine the
assertoric value of images.
Como ha expuesto PRICE: "BRANDOM doesn't claim that making assertions is the only game we can play with language, of course, but he does claim that the
assertoric game is both central and indispensable.
[o]n Horwich's view, a language game is to be understood as consisting of sentences for which (if we confine attention to
assertoric language) there are 'assertability conditions'.
Beliefs, Schafer thus proposes, present their contents with
assertoric force.
We should think of the use of i-representations as genuinely
assertoric: i-representations are genuinely factual.
Modalities, for him, pertain to the relations of predication, without challenging the
assertoric system of deductions simpliciter.
This approach is
assertoric, the offering of questions in the form of statements that stake out a claim on the real and demand a response (Montgomery, 2008).
With Rorty, I believe that Putnam is untenably trying to hold onto "the objectivity of
assertoric discourse," given his concession that "our norms and standards of warranted assertability" are contingent and do not converge upon a "fact of the matter." However, with Putnam, I do think that Rorty's position is not coherently assertable.